On the Limits of the Limits of Networking

Alexander Galloway and Eugene Thacker's essay on "The Limits of Networking" highlights some of the weaknesses of the discussion of "networks" and "networking" and the "network form" on the Left.

Galloway and Thacker's piece is a response to another piece by Gert Lovink and Florian Schneider, "Notes on the State of Networking" that appeared in the February, 2004 makeworld paper #4. The title is a pun on "state" as a physics term and "state" as a political term, as in the exercise of class power. "Networks", they write, "are the emerging form of organization in our time." But like assertions that we participate in a "knowledge economy" or live in the "information society", such statements are redundancies. All organizations are networks of some sort; an economy is impossible without knowledge, no matter what the level of technological development; society without information would not be a society.

I am being deliberately obtuse here, because there is common conflation of "networks" and the "network form". "Network" is device for talking about any process as the interaction of nodes via links -- a universal architectural structure, a powerful device for comprehending phenomena. "Network form" attempts to describe a means of organization in contrast to "hierarchical form". Discussions about the "network form" fail to appreciate the insights that network science has to offer. The result is a shallow conception (networks are conceived as "ahistorical entities" per Galloway and Thacker) doomed to political and organizational failure.

Per Lovink + Scheider:

"A radical critique of the information society implies analyzing the passages from the state of territory and the state of population to the state of networked globality or: Info-Empire....Rather than a simple application to improve life or increase efficiency, life becomes intrinsically networking and networking comes alive as unconditional attribute of social existence... The ultimate goal of networking has been, and still is, to free the user from the bonds of locality and identity. Power [counterposed to "networking" jd] responds to the presence of increasing mobility and communications of the multitudes with attempts to regulate them in the framework of traditional regimes that cannot be abandoned, but need to be reconfigured from scratch and recompiled against the networking paradigm: borders and property, labour and recreation, education and entertainment industries undergo radical transformations."

For Galloway + Thacker, their "point of departure" with L+S is that "Info-Empire" "must be defined at the level of the medium itself." They critique the popular conception of networks amongst the new new Left -- really, the "network form":

"In many current political discussions, networks are seen as the new paradigm of social and political organization. The reason is that networks [that is, the "network form" - jd] exhibit a set of properties that distinguishes them from the more centralized power structures. These structures are often taken to be merely abstract, formal aspects of the network -- which is itself characterized as a kind of meta-structure... What we end up with is a 'metaphysics of networks.'... What we question is not the network concept itself for, as a number of network examples show, they can indeed be effective modes of struggle. What we do question is the undue and exclusive reliance on the metaphysics of the network, as if this ahistorical concept legitimizes itself by merely existing."

I think G+T correctly challenge the fetishization of networks. Without a deepening of understanding of networks -- that they are expressions of a "law system" that binds the network to an operative environment -- we are left with the "metaphysics of networks". By "operative environment" I mean certain conditions which exist which render the necessary connections -- the law system -- operable. In the social world, this would be, for example, the mode of production, or more broadly, "history". The connections in a pre-agricultural economy are not constrained by the law of the maximization of profit that defines a capitalist economy. The links of "worker/boss" or property are, in the language of computers, no-ops -- not operative.

In the modern environment of electronics. with all of the production and communication possibilities they enable ("to free the user from the bonds of locality and identity"), the contest is not over "power" vs "network", but rather the law system itself that defines or gives a particular character to the network. The political challenge is to overthrow the law system, to re-make the network.

Galloway and Thacker use the narrower concept of "protocols" as the "what" that defines the network. In computer networking terms, "protocols" are the agreed upon rules that nodes use to enable links or communication. An agreement on protocol is a pre-requisite for links to be established. So in this sense, the protocols will determine, to a great extent, the nature of the links and hence the dynamics of the network. Political work then, needs to be "counter-protocological." And they clarify, the action is not counter-anything. "Counter-" implies reaction, restoration, conservation, preservation. Rather, political work needs to be "hypertrophic" -- pushing beyond, creating the new, exploring and claiming the undiscovered country.

Protocol is really a kind of grammar, or syntax. Inasmuch as the syntactical rules of language constrain our imagination, I can accept the notion of protocol as a form of control. But at the same time, communication is impossible without syntax. As Florian Cramer noted in her response on nettime-l to the G+T piece:

But as with any play, consisting of a ruleset and its free execution, control is never total to the extent that it wouldn't permit freedom... Freedom and control thus are not mutually exclusive, but mutually dependent on each other. To envision communication systems without control - i.e. languages without rules, networks without protocols - and find them desirable, would be utterly an infantilist vision of a pre-language paradise.

To focus in on "protocol" as the description of what defines the network misdirects, or does not go far enough. In computer networks, protocols are probably some of the most neutral aspects of the network, and to push the metaphor into the social network obscures too much. "Law system" is total and comprehensive, and not "neutral" in the way that "protocols" can be read as neutral, as the floor on which the great social contest plays out.

For the network of society, the fundamental relationship of private property in the age of electronics defines the network behavior. "Private property" describes only one possible mode of linking. If "private property" is the protocol in the most general metaphoric sense -- a system of constraints on the interactions between human beings -- well then bring on the counter-protocological practice and lets hypertrophe the network.

In any case, it's that understanding of network dynamics, the historical context and constraints and opportunities -- the law system that informs, binds, sets boundaries, describes, defines etc. etc. that seems to have been missing in the Discussion. And without the comprehension of those network dynamics -- what is and what needs to be done -- progress will be impossible.

"Close Doesn't Always Count in Winning Games" by Benedict Carey (New York Times, 3/7/05):

[S]ocial scientists who have studied group performance under pressure say that often it is decentralized groups (like the Yankees) that prove more resilient than strongly connected ones (like the Red Sox); they are better able to weather outside criticism and internal quarrels.

Evidence from personality profiles and from studies of military, corporate and space flight crews suggests that looser ties between group members can be a strength, if the team includes individuals who can generate collective emotion when needed. And the Yankees have several of them.

Some other key points:

-- "Winning is more likely to create team unity than vice versa, Torre has said repeatedly, and the evidence backs him up, said Dr. Richard Moreland, a professor of psychology and management at the University of Pittsburgh."

-- "When a common purpose is shared, loosely tied groups can function better than strongly bonded ones when it comes to containing dissent or bickering, research suggests." It allows individuals to withdraw from squabbles without disrupting the group's work.

-- "On a tightly knit team, by contrast, a falling out between key members can divide a squad, forcing people to take sides, psychologists say."

-- "Whether such independent, loosely tied people ultimately succeed as a unit depends not only on strong management, researchers say, but on the presence of individual group members who can circulate through disparate parts of the team, reduce conflict and help generate collective spirit when it is needed."

This flurry of activity is the result of poking around and seeing what there is on the net regarding networks, etc. And reflects to a great extent on my ignorance or dis-connectedness from the discussions that are taking place both in science and political circles. For example, from a year ago...

"The Limits of Networking" (also available in a prettier form at c u l t u r e k i t c h e n by Alex Galloway and Eugene Thacker is a response to a piece by Gert Lovink and Florian Schneider, "Notes on the State of Networking" which may also have appeared on the nettime-l list; the link is to the makeworlds site, previously mentioned in this blog. A response (also on nettime-l) to the Galloway/Thacker piece by Florian Cramer is good.

Comments will be forthcoming.

On the horizon: The Quantum Theory of Trust: How Networks Work and Organizations Behave; The Secret of Mapping and Managing Human Relationships. Anticipated publication date: September, 2005. There's an outline on the announcement page. Network science used to understand and enhance corporate culture; concepts look to apply to any organization.

jd

A bit more on network motifs:

A taxonomy of network motifs exists. For some clear descriptions and diagrams, see Network motifs. This page describes gene regulation, but it's not too hard to extrapolate from motifs like "autoregulatory", "feedforward", "multi-component loop", etc.

To understand how complex transcriptional regulatory networks produce gene expression programs, it is useful to identify the simplest units of commonly used network architecture. We imagine that these simple units, or network motifs, provide specific regulatory capacities such as positive and negative feedback loops. The frequency with which cells use individual motifs reveals the regulatory strategies that were selected during evolution. These motifs can be assembled into network structures that help explain how a complex gene expression program is regulated.

(from site above).

Network motifs

Connections or actions between nodes have a property of "direction". A can act on B, B can act on A, or A can act on B and B can act on A. In dialectical terms the latter case would be an interaction or interconnection. Throw in a third node, and the number of possible connection types grows to 13?; add a fourth, and the number jumps to 199. (I'm not sure of the math of this, the numbers are from the article referenced below.)

In a 2002 Science article, "Network Motifs: Simple Building Blocks of Complex Networks" six researchers studied various types of networks, and found "the striking appearance of motifs in networks representing a broad range of natural phenomenon."

The researchers studied various real-world networks, including gene regulation, neurons, food webs, electronic circuits, and the World Wide Web. Out of the range of all of the possible connections types, a small number of connection types -- that is, motifs -- showed up much more frequently than the others. Not all networks, though, have the same motifs. The presence of different motifs in different networks suggests a way of distinguishing types of networks.

"None of the network motifs shared by the food webs matched the motifs found in the gene regulation networks or the World Wide Web. Only one of the food web consensus motifs [their term, consensus motifs are "motifs shared by networks of a given type" - jd] also appeared in the neuronal network. Different motifs were found in electronic circuits with different functions. This suggests that motifs can define broad classes of networks, each with specific types of elementary structures. The motifs reflect the underlying processes that generated each type of network [my emphasis - jd]; for example, food webs evolved to allow a flow of energy from the bottom to the top of the food chains, whereas gene regulation and neuron networks evolve to process information. Information processing seems to give rise to significantly different structures than does energy flow.

Two more observations: (1) "In general, the larger the network is the more significant the motifs tend to become;" and (2) motifs "may be interpreted as structures that arise because of the special constraints under which the network has evolved."

Somehow this concept of "motif" is related to the concept of the "law system" (or, the necessary connections) that govern or constrain the interactions between nodes in the network. Or perhaps they are evidence of the existence of the law system? (These would be in part "the special constraints under which the network has evolved" -- internal constraints, while there are also external or environmental constraints as well?)

jd

This is a column I did a few years ago, relevant to this blog.

jd

---

The dumbest networks

Found on the Internet: The best network is the dumbest network. But... it's not the most profitable...

So we won't see it.

That's the implied conclusion in David Isenberg and David Weinberger's online essay "The Paradox of the Best Network".

A "dumb network" is a network that is optimized to move bits -- any kind of bits, all bits -- as fast as possible. "Only then is the network truly open to any and all services that want to use it, no matter how innovative or how unexpected. In the best network, the services live at the edges of the network and use the network to transport bits; they do not rely on any special characteristics of the network itself."

But, they argue, the simpler the network, the easier it is for any network operator to provide the service -- capacity grows, prices fall, all is good. Right? Except.

Telecom companies can't make money that way. (Witness the telecom carcasses along the road over the past two years: Northpoint, PSINet, CAIS/Ardent Communications, to name a few; and a number of companies like Global Crossing are teetering on the curb).

The telecom companies make money off of complicated, premium services that aren't versatile. So they have no incentive to develop the kind of networks that (a) serve the most people and (b) realize the possibilities of a well-networked world.

Isenberg and Weinberger argue that "[i]ncumbent communications company clout has forestalled delivery of a variety of radically simplified, extremely affordable technologies," like wireless and fiber optic networks.

It gets better: "Telephone companies are not the only institutions goaded by new network technology. We can see from the reaction to today's Internet that the Paradox of the Best Network is not kind to the recording industry, to book publishers, or to any other group that makes its living by controlling access to content. These groups have already called in the lawyers and lobbyists to protect their current business models. Nor will the new network be popular with any institution — economic, political or religious — that seeks to shield itself from conflicting cultures and ideas."

The apologists for our great economic system like to argue that yeah, capitalism might be rough, but the competitive spirit ensures that new technologies get developed and deployed. The paradox of the best network is just another example that this is a Big Lie.

Capitalism cannot make the most of new technologies. The above is just one more example. The best networks are not being built because they are too hard to make money from. An economic system that favors maximum profit over maximum satisfaction, maximum usability, maximum access, maximum information, etc. etc. is a bundle of chains on society, keeping it down.

Isenberg and Weinberger pose the obvious question: "But if the best network is also the cheapest and hardest to make money from, who will build it?"

The essay goes on to propose some ways to ensure the development of big, dumb networks. They plainly state that "Arguably, building the best network is a Public Good." But between the rock of telecom capitalism and the hard place of Enron-ized government -- here's where we need everyone's imagination and initiative.

What kind of society do we want? We have a world to win, And, well, nothing to lose but our chains.

* * *

Another reason why capitalism sucks: Harold Russell, the disabled World War II vet and non-actor who won an Academy Award for his remarkable performance in William Weller's classic movie "The Best Years of Our Lives", died in January. He was 88. In 1992 he was forced to sell his Oscar -- he needed the money to pay for his sick wife's medical bills.

Jim Davis
2/01/02



This originally appeared at http://www.lrna.org, now living at http://www.gocatgo.com/jdav/columns/dumbnet.html

Here's the description of a paper that I am planning to do for the The Global Studies Association Annual Conference, May 12 - 15, 2005 at the University of Tennessee in Knoxville:

Networks and globalization

"Network" is a popular metaphor for talking about globalization. For the most part, "network" has been just that -- a vague metaphor with many meanings. "Network science", a new cross-discipline offshoot of complexity theory, brings a formality to thinking about network structures. "Network science" concepts like "superconnectors", "preferential attachment", and "small-world effect" are universal in real-world networks, whether they be ecological, social or economic. "Network science" explains both the strengths of globalized capitalism, and its weaknesses. Perhaps more importantly, it provides powerful insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the "network form" of organization, the emerging structure of resistance to globalization.

jd

From Neal Stephenson's The System of the World, the concluding volume of The Baroque Cycle, a great read:

...I saw one or two smoke-rings about the size of a man's hat, propagating across the room, and retaining their shape and vis viva for extraordinary distance. These rings are unlike water-waves, which consist of different water at different times, for smoke rings propagate through clear air, proving that they indeed carry their own substance with them, neither diluting it with, nor dispersing it into, the surrounding atmosphere. And yet there is nothing special about the smoke as such -- it is the same smoke that hangs over battlefields in shapeless clouds. The identity of the smoke ring would appear to consist, not in the stuff of which it is made, for that is commonplace and indifferent, but rather in a particular set of relationships that is brought into being among its parts. It is this pattern of relationships that coheres in space and persists in time and endows the smoke-ring with an identity. Perhaps some similar observation might be made about other entities that we observe, and credit with uniqueness and identity, including even human beings. For the stuff of which we are made is just the common stuff of the world, viz. ordinary gross matter, so that a materialist might say, we are no different from rocks; and yet our matter is imbued with some organizing principle that endows us with identities, so that I may send a letter to Daniel Waterhouse in London in full confidence that, like a smoke ring traversing a battle-field, he has traveled a great distance, and persisted for a long time, and yet is still the same man." (a fictional Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz writing to Daniel Waterhouse; p54)

Some comments on yesterday's massive earthquake off of the coast of Sumatra, and the ensuing tidal waves that have crashed around the Indian Ocean reminded me of some scientist's description of complexity theory (or chaos theory?) that it is deterministic, not predictive. Which I read as "you know something is going to happen, just not when". The earthquake reporting clarifies what constitutes a prediction. This is from a Washington Post article "When Disaster Strikes" (12/27/2004):

[Caltech geologist Kerry Seih] he knew that, generally speaking, it was getting to be about time for another big one.

But a general forecast of a major quake sometime in the coming decades is not the same thing as a prediction. It's not a prediction unless the time window is so narrow that it can incite dramatic changes in the behavior of people who are vulnerable.

No one has a reliable prediction scheme," said Brian Tucker, president of GeoHazards International, a nonprofit group that tries to reduce the toll of natural disasters in developing countries. "Even if they did, the most reliable prediction would be in terms of probability. So you'd be saying that in the next six months, plus or minus three months, an earthquake of magnitude 6, plus or minus one unit, will occur" -- and even there there'd be uncertainty about the exact location.

"The public can't respond to that. What would a mayor do or a governor do with such a probabilistic prediction?" Tucker said.

jd

I'm reading Robert Shiller's book The New Financial Order: Risk in the 21st Century. I thought, from the title, that the books was more reportage of the current state of finance; it turns out to be prescription for dealing with risk through a higher order of financial tools. That is, ideas about fixing capitalism through more capitalism.

Still, there are important concepts outlined in the book. One could argue that risk management is another way of describing the material basis for society or human groups. We have a better chance of surviving together than apart. Capitalism, because of its focus on private property, competition and the individual, that is, by its fundamental law system, creates risk for people. These risks are over and above the natural risks of plagues, hurricanes, locusts, fire, drought, etc. Shiller outlines these risks, in particular risks to individual and national income and risks to savings. New technology adds to the risk mix under capitalism, by endangering old forms of earning income and undermining national economies through the vicissitudes of globalization. But new technology also allows new ways of hedging against risk, and his book describes some hypothetical financial instruments to distribute the risk.

Risk management is really an information game (e.g., the construction of actuarial tables in the 18th century provided the basis for modern insurance). By understanding probabilities of outcomes based on actual data, the cost of risk management can be determined, and priced accordingly. The complexity of risks that can be managed is, per Shiller, a function of the quality (speed, cost) of information technology. Information technology applies in the data collection and analysis department; and again in managing the distribution of shares of risk across a broad market of whoever wants to buy the risk, for some consideration (i.e., speculate). More sophisticated information processing technology means more complicated risks can be managed.

The way out of the destruction of capitalism then is through different kinds of insurance or derivatives for personal income, national income, home prices, etc. Socialism, or communism, is another, more obvious way of managing such risks -- that is, mutual social responsibility, mediated through public, community structures rather than hedge funds and banks.

Shiller's book does highlight the confluence of several themes I find of interest: new technologies allow us to understand or interact w/ processes in more discrete ways -- the pellets of iron have different properties than the ingot. New technologies shrink transaction costs -- the hookup cost (the cost of making a connection) and the transmission cost (the cost of using a connection), the processing cost (the time the node is busy). So more connections can happen. And as more connections happen, the medium exists for emergent properties to flower. These properties will be conditioned by the law system that governs the network/process.

Capitalism allows connections in very specific ways. Its volatility equals risk. Creative destruction, perhaps, but destruction nevertheless. The global may flourish, in an aggregate way, while the local is sacrificed quite brutally. Wealth polarizes. The factories of Canton and Akron are shuttered, while new ones open in Guangdong. The wheatfields of North Dakota lay fallow while those of the Ukraine or Argentina ripen.

Shiller envisions a global system of managing such risks via new financial instruments made possible by new information technology. Much more straightforward solutions have been proposed in the past; he is looking for ways to manage the symptoms while leaving the causes in place.

His argument, I think, is that capitalism allows for creativity, initiative and opportunity that other systems do not. But risk is the enemy of creativity and opportunity (better to go the safe route than the risky one), so managing the risk will allow for more opportunities to be explored, more experiments made, more connections explored, hence more likelihood of good things to happen (emergence). Which all sounds good, but also seems like hoping the wolf becomes a vegetarian.

"The Pentagon is building its own Internet, the military's world wide web for the wars of the future." So starts an article from the Nov. 13, 2004 NY Times, "Pentagon Envisioning a Costly Internet for War".

The article describes Pentagon plans for its "Global Information Grid" or GIG, its own secure network to distribute battlefield information. The effort is an aspect of "network-centric warfare" championed by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (see the May '04 post on the Nova "Battle Plan Under Fire" show for more). More battlefield information -- from satellites, other units, data archives, etc. -- will in theory allow soldiers to cut through the fog of war; and more real-time information requires more secure bandwidth than is currently available.

As Rumsfeld is quoted: "Possibly the single most transforming thing in our force will not be a weapons system, but a set of interconnections." More interconnections makes for a more efficient force (better use of resources, in particular information); and a network-form foe (e.g., the resistance in Iraq) can be fought most effectively? by a network-form force.

Whether such an approach is in fact effective is still not univerally accepted; it is, however, very expensive. $200 billion by some estimates once the costs for the special radios, satellites, laptops, cabling, routers, etc. are totalled up.

The pros and cons of "force transformation" and "network-centric warfare" have been debated elsewhere; what is significant I think about this article is the construction of a parallel, military-only Internet. The public 'net is apparently insufficient -- too leaky, insecure, narrow, clogged w/ spam and porn to be of use to the military. The current Internet had its roots in Defense, but was never intended to be a military-only infrastructure. One of its potent strengths is its openness, which allows for emergent properties. A closed-network will never achieve that; perhaps the price tag is how you buy security and robustness when you don't have 1/2 billion naked apes pounding on the keyboards. Or maybe the military's private skynet is ultimately unrealistic. As Vincent Cerf notes in the NYT article, "I want to make sure what we realize is vision and not hallucination... There's nothing wrong with having ambitious goals. You just need to temper them with physics and reality."

In Saskia Sassen's book The Global City (2001, Princeton University Press), she describes the (counter-intuitive) process of the formation of major urban centers like New York, London and Tokyo as the command centers of the global economy. I say counter-intuitive because new communication technologies allow for the decentralization of command and control. For a variety of reasons, Sassen argues that the opposite takes place.

Furthermore, these cities become, to some extent, disconnected from the nation-state:

These cities constitute a system rather than merely competing with each other. What contributes to growth in the network of global cities may well not contribute to growth as nations.(9)

She describes the architecture of a global network of cities: key cities as nodes, linked in a variety of ways, including financial flows, communication, travel, and trade.

For Sassen, one of the important reasons for the formation of these global cities are changes in the financial system from the 1980s on, requiring the concentration of firms (and the workers at all levels to support the concentration) in the global cities to make the system work.

That is, the emergence of speculative capital carried with it certain imperatives that contribute not just to globalization, but to the network of globalization. The city nodes provide a concrete reflection of the digitalized connections of 21st century finance.

jd

Media - information networks - noosphere

Here's a link to the freepress site campaign to pressure Sinclair broadcasting to not show the anti-Kerry documentary a few days before the election, or at least to provide equal time for counter-programming:

http://freepress.net/sinclair/

I know this barely scratches the surface of addressing what is wrong w/ the dominant media networks; that Bush vs Kerry is a flimsy set of choices; etc. etc. But on the other hand, that's what is in front of us now, so ... deal with it.

jd

One of the foundation ideas of materialism is that we live in a law-governed universe. And one of the foundation concepts of dialectics (and focal points of this blog) is interconnectedness. Probably the most important type of interconnection is that of cause-and-effect. Here's an excerpt from a recent Nature item of interest:

Is causality an inherent and necessary characteristic of the Universe, or just an illusion produced by the way our brains interpret the world?

It's real, say physicists, who believe they have worked out how the Universe is constructed from the tiniest building-blocks of space-time. The finding could also help the development of a theory of quantum gravity, which would marry the two currently estranged physical theories of the Universe: quantum theory and relativity.

How can the observable universe emerge out of quantum interactions at the tiniest level?

"Physicists have long been trying to figure out how the fuzzy nature of space-time at this tiny scale can give rise to the large four-dimensional Universe we see around us, as described by Einstein's theory of relativity."

In trying to assemble these tiny quanta pieces,

Renate Loll of Utrecht University in the Netherlands and her co-workers have now found a way to assemble the pieces so that they inevitably produce a four-dimensional Universe. Instead of assuming that all tilings are allowed, they impose two constraints.

First, the theory of relativity must apply within each individual tile (so that nothing can travel through it faster than light) and second, the assembly must preserve causality. This means that a piece of space-time cannot be constructed in such a way that an 'event' - some change in the Universe - precedes its cause.

When they enforced these criteria on their calculations, the researchers ended up with universes with three spatial dimensions and one time dimension - just like our own1. It was "like magic", says Loll.

Even more startling, they found that typical universes generated this way started off small and got bigger - they expanded, just like the real Universe has done since the big bang. This was completely unexpected - there was nothing in the tiling rules that seemed to demand it. 'We're completely stunned,' says Loll.

She admits that there's no a priori reason to demand that quantum space-time has to observe causality: the researchers put it into their equations by hand. But that, it seems, is the only way to end up with a realistic Universe.

For the complete item: http://www.nature.com/news/2004/041004/full/041004-17.html

"Without a corresponding theory of behavior -- of dynamics -- a theory of network structure is essentially uninterpretable and therefore of little practical use." (Duncan Watts, Six Degrees, 51)

In an earlier post (6/6/04), I referenced Steven Johnson's Emergence book where he talks about idea revolutions and paradigm shifts in terms of emergence (and by easy extrapolation, as aspects of network behavior).

Here's a relevant story to terrify the kids at bedtime:

"Intelligent design advocates say that teaching students to 'critically analyze' evolution will help give them the skills to 'see both sides' of all scientific issues. And if the Discovery Institute execs have their way, those skills will be used to reconsider the philosophy of modern science itself - which they blame for everything from divorce to abortion to the insanity defense. 'Our culture has been deeply influenced by materialist thought,' says Meyer. 'We think it's deeply destructive, and we think it's false. And we mean to overturn it.'" ("The Crusade Against Evolution", Wired, Oct. 2004. (And see also: "Discovery Institute's 'Wedge project' circulates online".

This is an example of hacking the idea network, to change both it's behavior and its content.

jd

And related to the write-up just posted on the west coast dock situation two years ago (should be just below), the Wall Street Journal carried a news story by Margot Cohen last week (9/22/04) "Wave of the Future: China, Vietnam Supplant Philippines as Port of Call For Finding Low-Cost Crews". In the previous post I referred to a talk by Edna Bonacich that included info about the nature of sailor labor. This article brings that aspect of global transportation up-to-date.

"The shipping industry is searching the world for new sources of seafarers. Pressured to cut costs and boost competitiveness, shipowners are looking for ordinary seamen -- known as 'ratings' -- who are willing to work for lower salaries and endure tougher conditions than their current crews are. That search is taking owners everywhere from China, Vietnam and Myanmar to Latvia, Georgia and Ukraine."

"About a third of seamen come from just one nation: the Philippines. Thanks, in part, to their superior English and compatibility with other nationalities on board, Philippine seamen have come to dominate this labor market over the past 15 years. But over the years, the Filipinos' unions have secured pay raises for their members that shipowners find increasingly burdensome."

[So what was once low cost labor supplier (in this case the Phillippines) becomes even too expensive (we're talking $1100 - 1500 per month, including overtime and benefits), and so the search is on for even cheaper labor. However, the situation is more complex than just finding workers with modern sailing skills. Language is important -- English is the esperanto of the shipping industry so sailors without that skill are at a disadvantage. And also, given crews of mixed countries of origin, the ability to culturally mix is important too. The nature of the labor requires cooperation at the point of production (or transportation as the case may be).]

"And so, once again, owners are searching for new crews, just as they have done many times in the past: In the 1970s, European ratings were largely replaced by Indians who were, in turn, displaced by Filipinos in the 1980s. In the early 1990s, the collapse of the Iron Curtain left the global shipping industry flush with well-trained and experienced seamen from Eastern Europe, who now account for about 25% of ratings. Now, as their own economies improve, the pickings are getting slimmer."


[An index of the swath cut by globalization...]

So here is an aspect of the network of globalization -- the links expressed by the shipping industry, and within that link, the detail of the workers, and the network of their relations to each other.

jd

The following is a column I wrote a couple of years ago as a strike was looming on the West Coast docks in the U.S. The world economy, as a network, is connected in many ways, not the least of which is the transportation system which moves goods from producer to market; or market to consumer. The digital transport system is a part of this (i.e., the Internet and other digital communication systems). Older forms are still key components also, for moving about those things which cannot be digitally rendered.

A West Coast longshore workers strike is looking likely. The International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU), which represents the dock workers and clerks at the ports from Long Beach to Seattle, is stuck in contract talks with the Pacific Maritime Association (PMA), which represents the major shipping lines, over who's going to pay what for health care benefits.

All that stuff on the shelves at Walmart and Target -- big surprise -- is made across the big water in the sweatshops of Asia. Somehow it has to get to Walmart and Target. In the global economy, the transportation section of the economy -- shipping, trucking, warehousing, railroads -- plays a key role. It's relatively easy to move a factory from Chicago or Buffalo to Mexico or Indonesia; it's hard to move 280 million consumers. So the big retailers are stuck having to deal with transportation workers.

Shipping, like every other part of the economy, has been undergoing a technology revolution; and, as a result, an upheaval in the way it is organized and run. The big modern container ships are so big that they can't get through the Panama Canal. Which means goods destined for the U.S. must pass through the west coast docks. The west coast ports, and especially the ports of Los Angeles, are the gateways to the malls of America.

A lot is at stake. According to Edna Bonacich, a researcher at the University of California - Riverside, a one week strike on the west coast docks would cost American business $5 billion. A two-week strike would cost them $20 billion. Modern manufacturing relies on "just-in-time" production; modern retailing relies on "just-in-time" goods. That is, there aren't lots and lots of computer chips or shoes sitting in warehouses -- the factories and stores count on a smoothly flowing distribution pipeline to keep the assembly line and shelves primed. An interruption of more than just a few days quickly disrupts the global assembly line.

September 11 provided the cover for a big advance in the building a police state begun under Clinton and U.S. administrations before him. Now just about anything that threatens the interest of capitalism is being passed off as a security threat. In the inside-out logic of the Bush regime, a humming U.S. economy needs working docks, therefore a longshore strike would be a security threat. As would any effort by workers and people without to defend their rights or secure basics like housing, food, health care, etc. The Bush administration is considering its options. These include the invoking a range of laws to break a strike, up to and including using the U.S. Navy to work the docks -- a wartime measure, but, after all, we are in a war against terror.

Beyond the current looming strike, the march of technology proceeds apace. The shipping companies and the giant retailers who pull their strings want deregulated, strike-free, smooth-running ports. Like the Liverpool "dockers" and the Australian "dockers" before them, the workers of the ILWU stand in the way. The ILWU faces a future of automated docks. But blocking new technology that relieves people of dangerous, dull or dirty work is no answer. The problem is an economic system that blocks new technology from being used for the benefit of all, and instead uses new technology to terrorize people with a future of poverty.

The west coast dock situation demands that we defend what the ILWU has won. It also demands that we fight not just against each new brick of the police state, but for a new economy free of the terror of poverty. The whole situation points to a need for a political party to represent our class -- like the Labor Party.

Jim Davis
8/24/02

Additional information on the west coast dock situation

David Bacon, "Bush Threatens Dockers' Right To Strike"

International Longshore and Warehouse Union

Pacific Maritime Association
(This is the trade association that represents the shippers)

West Coast Waterfront Coalition

(This is the association of shipping customers whose businesses depend on the steady flow of goods through the ports. Its members include Gap, Home Depot, Target, Walmart, etc.)

In a talk at a globalization conference in Chicago last May [2002], Edna Bonacich, a researcher at the University of California - Riverside, described the trans-Pacific shipping industry. The next bit is from notes I took at the conference -- jd
In the drive to cut costs, much of the transportation sector has been de-regulated. Most shipping lines register their ships under "flags of convenience", like Panama or Liberia, where enforcing maritime laws is difficult. The boats are basically floating sweatshops. The use of standard-sized containers going back to the 1960s (pioneered, by the way, by the U.S. Navy to make it easier to move stuff in wartime), coupled with advanced computer and imaging technology, have led to largely automated docks (which is actually the case in the Rotterdam port in Holland). Boats can be unloaded so fast that shore leave for the handful of predominantly Filipino or Chinese sailors is a thing of the past, making them virtual prisoners on the boats for months at a time. In the most important port of L.A., the goods are loaded onto trucks driven by "independent contractors" -- code words for low paid, high-stressed, often undocumented workers, "sweatshops on wheels" -- and hauled up I-10 to the giant warehouse complexes of the Inland Empire. There, the goods are sorted by close-to-minimum wage workers for trucks or rail destined to the Walmarts and Targets of the heartland. And there still are a lot of factories in the U.S. that depends on parts and materials from Asia. In the middle, are the relative handful of unionized, well-paid ILWU workers running the cranes and processing the paperwork at the docks.

I'm reading James Surowiecki's The Wisdom of Crowds, which is a generally useful addition to the broad genre of popular treatments of complexity, emergence, networks and the like. His particular focus is on the decision-making process, as opposed to the emergence of order in systems as discussed in Steven Johnson's Emergence. Setting aside the rather bizarre conception of "rational behavior" as narrow self-interest that provides the straw man for many of his observations about social behavior, there is much of interest for anyone involved in committees, collectives, organizations, etc.

One of the general challenges of the "network form" is how to ensure that the organization maintains some coherence and common purpose via a decentralized structure. Surowiecki addresses this question in chapter 4 of his book.

Decentralization's great strength is that it encourages independence and specialization on the one hand while still allowing people to coordinate their activities and solve difficult problems on the other. Decentralization's great weakness is that there's no guarantee that valuable information which is uncovered in one part of the the system will find its way through the rest of the system. Sometimes valuable information never gets disseminated, making it less useful that it otherwise would be. What you;d like is a way for individuals to specialize and to acquire local knowledge -- which increases the total amount of information available in the system -- while also being able to aggregate that local knowledge and private information into a collective whole. (p 71-2)

That is, the problem is not "decentralization" per se, but data aggregation in the system (that is, in the network). "[A] decentralized system can only produce generally intelligent results if there's a means of aggregating the information of everyone in the system." (74)

"Information aggregation" is a network function in that the structure of the network -- the efficiency of the links, the degree of filtering or friction or consolidation at the nodes -- determines how well information is aggregated. If links are missing, or nodes collect but do not forward information, aggregation will suffer.

"Aggregation -- which could be seen as a curious form of centralization -- is therefore paradoxically important to the success of decentralization". (75) The "centralization" is really the "collectivization" of information, transforming it from local to global information. "It's possible and desirable, to have collective decisions made by decentralized agents."

Decentralization is hard, and teeters on the edge of disorganization. The crucial difference is the integrity of the network in keeping the nodes in contact, and providing the mechanism for information aggregration.

Citing the Iraq army during the 2003 Iraq war, the destruction of the Iraqi command and control system left pockets of resistance -- "all tactics and no strategy" per one British commander. The U.S. Army, on the other hand, is cited as the "true decentralized military" in that war. Individual units were given wide latitude for decision-making, but maintained a functioning communication system that allowed the local experience/information to be shared, aggregated and become collective information.

The chain of command remains essential to the way the military works, and all battlefield action takes place within a framework defined by what's known as the Commander's Intent, which essentially lays out a campaign's objectives. But increasingly, successul campaigns may depend as much on the fast aggregation of information from the field as on preexisting, top-down strategies. (p 77)

jd